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Edward Price argues that the recent Greek election results show that the Euro is more than
a currency; it is an identity. The Germans are dealing with two opposing dilemmas: fighting to
save the Euro and fighting against inflation. In the end however, he argues, we should bet on
Germany fighting to save the Euro.
June’s election in Greece was a long-term bet on Europe, not austerity. This is important to
understand, as it illustrates the political dynamic at the heart of the Eurozone crisis,
something often lost in market commentary. That political dynamic to date has been
communication between nations – principally Germany, France and Greece. Now it is
changing to include communication between European electorates.
First things first, we should expect more protests in Athens. Discontent will continue, regardless of what
small changes New Democracy’s Antonis Samaras may achieve as prime minister on renegotiating the
terms of Greek loans. That is bad news. Protests fuel uncertainty, which does nothing for the reputation of the
Euro.
Second, however, is something curious. Europe’s individual national electorates are showing some signs of
thinking as one constituency. In other words, election results in France made a Greek bet on Europe possible,
as French voters signalled to Greeks a high-level EU move away from pure austerity. This subsequently
allowed Greeks to focus on the political risks of Eurozone exit, and vote in favour of the single currency.
Drawn-out uncertainty has made a bad crisis worse. This apparent electoral interaction in Europe is a good
development. It will pressure European leaders for more coherence. Still disagreeing on many aspects of
crisis response, European voters nonetheless seem to be offering at least some kind of agenda, broadly
speaking a pro-Euro, pro-growth sketch.
The exception is Germany, where the public and various media share concerns with the Merkel government
on bailouts and debt. A recent edition of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung’s economics section made German
feelings clear, describing as morphine the European Central Bank’s potential future role in helping
Greece. Anything that hides the pain of peripheral countries in need of real restructuring is not something that
will appeal to the current German mood.
Markets, investors, commentators and credit rating agencies have however misinterpreted the German
position throughout the crisis, seeing the largest and richest EU nation’s rejection of shared European debt as
an inflexible fiscal stance. Germany has done its best to present that line, yet, if listening closely, markets
would remember Merkel’s famous phrase: “If the Euro fails, then Europe fails”.
Germany does not want the Euro to fail. Berlin’s reluctance to act has been as much a political signal as it
has an (arguably laudable) fiscal stance. Germans and Greeks have, in other words, been in a stand-off. The
larger nation did not want the smaller to think Berlin would do anything for the Euro and by default for Athens
too. That would have voided any Greek incentive to accept austerity. Markets have panicked at this obstinacy.
Likewise, the implied Greek threat of triggering a Eurozone meltdown was political, not something designed to
spook markets directly, but to rile Germany via those markets. Greco-German relations have in fact been a
very large, very dangerous game of dare – a vast game of high-stakes poker – whilst seemingly
representative of each country’s final fiscal stance. Markets looked at what they were given, and did not like
what they saw. The game was played over a precipice.
With its election result, Greece has blinked first. Berlin will respond with a reward of sorts, and will
ultimately compromise on shared European debt and perhaps another look at Greece bailout terms. Paris is
a softening influence and together a conservative Greece and socialist France have given the Euro its best
chance yet. Germany will feel a lot of pressure to return a high powered serve.
Nevertheless, markets will continue to worry about debt. The single currency weakened in anticipation of a
European Council summit this week, largely because markets suspect the summit will see movement on the
problematic issue of European banks and will include growth on the agenda. That sounds like “more debt” to
markets, and Spain and Italy both issue just that – more debt – this week.
Markets might move in herds, but they are not stupid. Political developments aside, the economics of the
Eurozone crisis remain. The conundrum is simple: some economies in Europe have unsustainable levels of
accumulated debt, while those same economies will require debt, or stimulus, to end painful recessions.
They cannot raise the money themselves and so must turn to Berlin for cash, yet Germany remains a very
hard nut to crack.
A prediction: Germans will prove like the Greeks, more afraid of the political risks associated with a Eurozone
failure than they are worried at the fiscal. The political risks are naturally huge, nothing less than the potential
failure of Germany’s entire post-war identity. Likewise, fiscal risks are also vast, a post-Bundesbank era in
which the European Central Bank loosens – and possibly loses – its mandate of price control in the
Eurozone. The German mind is torn between two nightmares, fighting against inflation and fighting for the
Euro.
The latter will eventually win out, a priority promoted by European voters in Greece and France who have
made the big bet on Europe that Berlin has not yet made. Greece will stay in the Euro and Berlin will in time
reply with a compromise on shared debt, most likely weakening the value of the Euro over time. Who will be
happy thereafter – markets, electorates, and governments alike – remains to be seen. For now, this Greek
vote shows the Euro is as much a political identity as it is a single currency. That is important information for
anyone taking – or making – bets on how this crisis will end.
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